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Mark Bovens & Anchrit Wille​[1]​


Education Gaps in Politics

The book Diplomademocratie, which was published in Dutch in 2011, ended with a brief note of justification from our side. With the publication of our book, we hoped both to deliver an academically sound contribution to the public debate, and to explain political trends in a readable manner, so as to make the book accessible to a broader public. It was a difficult balancing act to pull off. On the one hand, we did not want to bore the reader with methodological details, incomprehensible figures and unreadable tables. On the other hand, we knew that our colleagues would be looking over our shoulders to see whether our analyses were valid and reliable. 
We welcome this opportunity to discuss our findings and arguments with our academic peers. We nevertheless feel that our critics have been rather selective in their reading of our book and on various crucial points suffer from a clear misapprehension or misrepresentation of our arguments. Therefore, we would like to begin with the main arguments of our book, Diplomademocratie, and the 2010 Acta Politica article which preceded it. For this rejoinder, the following are most important.
	Firstly, we concluded that the less educated are virtually absent in almost all relevant political arenas in The Netherlands. In three consecutive chapters, we analysed all relevant elements of the participation pyramid. One chapter was devoted to political participation proper - not only voting or demonstrating, but also new forms of participation, such as internet activism and participation in deliberative settings, and membership of political parties. Another chapter concentrated on the dominance of the well educated among the political elites, particularly in parliament and cabinet. A third chapter focussed on membership of civil society organisations and interest groups. 
	Secondly, we discussed some possible consequences of this dominance of those with higher levels of education, concentrating on potential biases in political agenda setting, due to diverging preferences between the well educated and the less well educated. We concluded that no substantial differences between educational groups could be found along the traditional left-right or religious-secular divides. However, regarding the socio-cultural divide, which has emerged in the past decades, substantial differences in policy preferences between educational groups could be observed. Similarly, large differences could be observed regarding political trust and political cynicism, with the well educated being the least, and the lesser educated being the most cynical and distrustful.
	Thirdly, we observed that this divide, between well educated citizens, with more cosmopolitan values, and people with low educational attainment, who tend to espouse more nationalist values and preferences, runs parallel to the rise of a new divide in the Dutch political landscape, visible since 2002, between social-liberal parties, such as GL and D66, and more nationalist parties, such as the SP and PVV (Tiemeyer, 2006: 191-195; Achterberg, 2006; Pellikaan et al., 2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). The former predominantly attract well-educated voters, the later predominantly the least educated voters. 
One of our aims in the book and in the article was to call attention to this new educational divide in Dutch politics. We argued that the recent emergence of populist parties has given people with less education more visibility in the Dutch political landscape. New eurosceptic and nationalist parties with a populist style, such as the LPF, SP, and PVV, have successfully campaigned on a platform that addresses the issues and preferences of those members of the electorate with low and medium levels of education. We concluded that this may not only be a temporary correction of a previously biased political agenda, but also a more permanent shift in the Dutch political landscape, as it has been elsewhere (Kriesi et al 2008; Houtman et al. 2008; Stubager 2010). 

Have these Gaps Widened? 
A relevant empirical question is whether these various educational gaps have increased over time. This was an issue raised by Hakhverdian et al. Although we studied the educational gap in several political arenas—cabinet, parliament, political parties, civil society organisations--Hakhverdian et al. restrict their analysis to one specific arena only: that of the broader forms of political participation (voting and civic participation). They say they have done ‘a comprehensive test’, using several DPES (Dutch Parliamentary Electoral Studies) waves from the period 1971 to 2010, to conclude that there is no evidence for a widening educational gap. We like to think this broad claim is not substantiated by their analysis, for a number of reasons. 


What we claimed 
Firstly, as mentioned above, our argument is based on an analysis of a wide array of political arenas and forms of participation, and a long time frame. For example, in chapter 3 of the book we analyse membership of parliament and the cabinet over the past century. However, Hakverdian et al. limit their analysis to a few traditional forms of political participation. Based on an analysis of a limited set of variables within a limited time frame - the last 40 years - Hakhverdian et al. criticize our conclusions about the whole participation pyramid.
More importantly, anyone who has read the book or the article will notice that we were extremely reticent about making longitudinal claims regarding the eventual widening of a  gap in the specific forms of participation on which they focus in their paper. 
	Regarding voting, we can suffice by quoting from our book: ‘In 1967, before the abolition of compulsory voting, the turnout at the parliamentary elections of the voters with primary education only, was almost on a par with the turnout of voters with a university degree. After this was abolished, the turnout of the more highly educated groups remained  high, whereas the turnout of the less educated fluctuated at a much lower level. […] The abolition of compulsory voting led in particular to lower voter turnout in municipal, provincial and European elections. […] particularly citizens with less education stay at home during these elections. The increasing weight of the well educated voters in the ballot, as far as we are concerned, is mainly seen in these second order elections.’ (Bovens & Wille 2011: 39-40). To the extent we made a claim at all, this regarded second order elections – however, these are not covered by Hakhverdian et al.
	Regarding political (or civic) participation outside elections, in their analysis (that runs only from 1971 to 1998) Hakhverdian et al. found ‘that the higher educated are more likely to engage in civic activities than the lowest educated, but again, this difference remains stable over time’. Yet, in the book we made no claims about any widening gap in this respect. All we said was: ‘Because of the changeable and less institutionalised character of these different forms of political participation, differences through time are difficult to measure (Bovens & Wille 2011: 40).
	Regarding distrust, we made no claims whatsoever about a widening gap. Regarding cynicism we concluded that, indeed, evidence of a widening gap could be traced back to the early seventies (Bovens & Wille 2011: 105). However, we added the following comment: ‘with the caveat that most of the increase dates from the seventies and eighties and that the differences have not increased in the past decade’ (Bovens & Wille 2011: 107). We did not have the DPES 2010 data at our disposal when we finished the manuscript, but the recent slight increase in trust among those with less education, and the decrease seen among the well educated, perfectly fits our argument. The rise of populist parties, such as LPF, TON, SP and PVV, and the recent support of the PVV of the Rutte-cabinet, has led to a strong correction of a political agenda that hitherto had been biased towards the well educated. It comes as no surprise that at the start of the Rutte-Wilders cabinet, trust in the cabinet particularly increased among both the predominantly lesser educated PVV and SP voters.​[2]​ 
To conclude, our claims about these limited topics regarding the last 40 years are far less sweeping than Hakverdian et al. suggest, and to a large extent even run parallel to their findings. 

What we did not claim
Their critique, however, becomes downright misleading when they attribute to us some startlingly incorrect inferences -  things we didn’t say, nor implied at all. 
	Hakhverdian et al. write: ‘we wish to engage Bovens and Wille on their claim that vote choice is much more determined by educational attainment nowadays than it was decades ago’. Frankly, we didn’t research this and we certainly never made any such claim.
	Hakhverdian et al. state that when it comes to political interest, the gap between the most and least educated ‘narrows’ over time. Yet precisely this aspect, i.e., political interest, is not included in our analysis. Based on what we knew from the literature (van der Eijk et al.  1992; Aarts & Thomassen 2000: 48-52; Dekker 2000) and previous analyses, we assigned political interest only a very modest place in the book. Other than being one of the variables that is related to differences in political participation (43-44), we made no explicit references to it.   
	Hakhverdian et al. have set up a regression analysis which showed that in six out of seven selected political variables education has ‘roughly the same effect today as it has four decades ago’. But an increasing education gap is not equivalent to an increased effect of education. We merely described, in both the article and the book, the differences among educational groups, and we did not set out to explain the effect of education on participation. 


Why Long Term Claims about the Effect of Education are Difficult to Make

One of the reasons for our extreme caution in making long term claims and drawing conclusions on the basis of the DPES data on participation has to do with the typical threats to longitudinal design validity. These problems also challenge the validity of Hakhverdian et al.’s  longitudinal findings. We will discuss four flaws that impair the weight of their conclusions about the effect of education on participation. 

Under-estimating the education effect
Hakhverdian et al. used a dataset compiled of 13 separate DPES cross-sectional surveys covering the period from 1971 to 2010. The difficulty of studying the long term impact of education on political participation is that these DPES data are time-structured data with respect to education.  First, the level of educational attainment of the population has increased during the past 40 years. Second, response rates have declined, leading to a biased overrepresentation of higher educated respondents in the DPES. Figure 1 shows a gradual increase of those in the higher educated categories, from 1% in 1972 to 23% in 2006; and a gradual decrease of less well-educated people, from 77% in 1972 to 22% in 2006. Hakhverdian et al. claim, however, that this change in the composition of the sample does not affect its validity for estimating the educational gap. 


Ignoring this fundamental change in the population on the most essential variable confounds their empirical analysis. Not only because a strong sampling bias towards those with a higher education in the DPES may lead to an underestimation of the impact of education (cf. van der Kolk 2000: 226). It also neglects the independent impact of rising education levels on participation. This misunderstanding of Hakhverdian et al. becomes palpable when they critically paraphrase our Acta article (2010: 417): ‘When Bovens and Wille write that “the least educated [...] have virtually disappeared from most layers of the participation pyramid” this implicitly assumes that they were present in the same pyramid before.’ But citizens from the large category of those with lower educational attainment were indeed participating in the 1970s. Dekker (2000: 85) analysing the period 1977-1998 on the basis of DPES data (nearly the same period as the Hakhverdian et al. study), indicates that there was an independent effect of  increasing educational levels on political participation. He concluded that as a consequence of the increased level of educational attainment in the population: ‘in 1977 there were still slightly more less educated than well educated among the participants, by 1998 every less educated participant was confronted with five well educated participants’. 
Cross wave invalidities
One of the problems with a longitudinal research design is that not only the educational composition of the population has noticeably changed, but also the educational system and the meaning of being well and lower educated. Given the importance of schooling, governments keep on modernizing their education systems by replacing and abolishing different school types.  Consequently, different cohorts of respondents have been exposed to different school systems. The problem of registering longitudinal changes in the educational gap is the incredible diversity in school types that varies over time.  This makes that valid and meaningful comparisons across periods are hard to make.​[3]​ 
		This problem with cross-wave validity affects the measurement of political participation to an even greater extent. Political activities such as joining a demonstration and joining a civic action group, which had become part of the standard political action repertory in the eighties, were wearing thin in the nineties. Newly emerging participation styles, such as the use of internet, texting, e-mail petitions, and interactive and deliberative policy making, were replacing the old forms of political participation - and precisely these new forms were avidly adopted by the more highly educated population groups.  Hence studying changes in the educational gap in political participation (and making valid comparisons through time) on the basis of the DPES waves is very difficult, especially where participation in such non-institutionalized forms of political activity is concerned.
To solve this problem, Hakverdian et al. have used composite measures that combined different questions into indices, claiming that doing so would improve the reliability and validity. But, as is well known from the literature (Brady 1999, Dekker 2000), there is little agreement as to which variable best measures political attitudes and participation - single variables or composite indices. The validity of a composite performance measure depends on the purpose for which it is applied. A composite performance measure that is composed of several measures may have excellent validity for summarizing (data reduction) or for descriptive purposes, but can have poor validity when used for explanatory purposes or to predict the impact of education.  

A fixation with control variables
In our book and article we used simple bivariate models with very few variables. This approach is different from the ‘comprehensive’ model of Hakhverdian et al. with a wide variety of control variables. Their multivariate model not only includes education, gender, age, income, but also urbanization and religion. Although we understand the motivation for inclusion--to rule out competing explanations—we also believe that political scientists have become too ‘fixated’ with using control variables (cf. Achen 2002; Ray 2003). In our Acta article we criticized the under-theorized approach of producing empirical models with a ‘battery of variables’ in which ‘little attention is given to why and how these variables make a difference’. We are particularly worried that urbanization and religion are added as controls, given that the literature indicates the conditional and interaction impact of  urban contexts and religion on political preferences and participation of the well and less well educated (Koster et al. 2010; van der Waal et al. 2011). Dumping in every observable control variable you can find that just might correlate with the independent variable isn't necessarily justified even if you have legitimate concerns about omitted variable bias. This is especially because competitor variables may bias the inference for the key variables of interest. Distinguishing ‘competing’ variables from ‘confounding’ variables entails, however, the use of descriptive statistical tools to carefully examine the data, especially across different domains (time periods, participation modes).
An  under-theorized approach to the education-effect
The objective of their regression-analysis, we assume, is to build an explicit and well-reasoned model of the changing impact of education on political participation, in a way that broadens and deepens our understanding of what might be going on. In doing this it is necessary to show why the chosen variables matter, a task accomplished by specifying an explicit theoretical model and logically teasing out empirical consequences from such a model. Our overarching point is that Hakhverdian et al. built a model without any theoretical foundation (and without any further empirical testing to the robustness of their findings). This under-theorized approach contributes little to the understanding of the impact of education on participation.
Although we did not set out to explain the changing effect of education on participation in our book and article, we wholeheartedly agree that this may deserve further exploration. However, we disagree that an a-theoretical use of analytical models is the most appropriate way to understand this process. 


Do the Well and the Less Well Educated Have Different Agendas and Policy Preferences? 
Both in the book and the article, we did make claims about diverging political agendas and preferences between well-educated and less well-educated citizens regarding socio-cultural issues, such as crime, the admittance of asylum seekers, cultural integration of immigrants, and EU unification. The more highly educated favour more liberal policies with regard to cultural integration, crime fighting and refugees, and they are more positive about European unification than those with the least education. Also, the well educated are more concerned about nature and the environment, and education. To show the differences in policy preferences between lower and higher educated groups, we used rather straightforward methods (plain percentages and means). Waterborg et al. are not convinced by our conclusions, replicated two of our analyses and conclude ‘that the disparate issue agendas and preferences between different education levels are in fact non-existent’. 
Much as we applaud academic debate and critical efforts subjecting our theory to serious scrutiny, we were rather puzzled by their replications and view both as fruitless exercises. Our problems concern the following points:  
	In their first replication, Waterborg et al. claim that if we would have used ‘priority rankings’—as they have used in their replication—then we would have got a ‘proper assessment’ of how consensual Dutch society really is. However, Waterborg et al. make some serious mistakes in the interpretation of our intentions and the data. First our intentions. We looked at the answers mentioned by respondents in an open question on ‘the most important problem facing our country’. It was a rather straightforward analysis based on qualitative data—aimed to see whether there were differences between the different educational groups in the type of public concerns and issues these groups worry about; and that were thus on their public agendas. Our aim was, however, not to examine the agendas in terms of major and minor problems (or to present the complete listing of issue ‘priorities’ of the different educational segments). Waterborg et al.’s complaint that we ‘provide no reason whatsoever for presenting minor issues’ probably is related to this misunderstanding. The top five problems produced by this open question--crime, unemployment and inflation, welfare state issues, ethics—were not the most relevant for further examination. These are what Donald Stokes (1966) has called, ‘valence’ issues-- uncontroversial and shared political ends. Few people favour crime, high rates of unemployment or moral decay. Given their consensual character, it seemed logical to explore the issues that were beyond these valence issues.  
	A serious point of concern is Waterborg et al.’s interpretation of the answers to the open question. True, the question on ‘the most important problem facing the nation’ is open to several interpretations—especially, because it confuses two dimensions of salience: the importance of issues and the degree to which issues are a problem (Wlezien 2005). But by persistently talking about ‘issue priorities’, and ‘highly prioritized issues’, Waterborg et al. seem to suggest that the answers of respondents are the result of a profound prioritization of national problems. However, these were just broad answers to a very open question. Their ‘priority ranking-interpretation’ gets even more off beam when they apply it to the ranked issue agendas in table 1 and write: “not only do higher educated rank the same issue as top priorities, our replication even shows substantial overlap in prioritizing less important issues”. Drawing such a conclusion about individuals on base of aggregate rankings, is not only incorrect; it borders on an ecological fallacy. 
	We were puzzled to learn that Waterborg et al. think that for the ‘proper assessment’ of agenda disparities one should not concentrate on the ‘frequency that a problem was mentioned’ but on ‘the rank order of the problems’. Looking at the percentages is, in their words, ‘problematic, since a considerable difference exists between the number of problems identified by lower and higher educated’. Respondents in the DPES survey were allowed—even encouraged—to mention up to seven issues they consider as the most important problems facing our country today (this is why talking about issue priorities is so out of place). Higher educated dominate the issue agenda data, because they mentioned, on average, more problems than lower educated, as Waterborg et al. indicate. It is a perfect illustration in the DPES data of one of the troublesome mechanisms we wanted to describe in politics with our analysis of a diploma democracy. Higher educated are more articulated, know how to ‘verbalize’ their public concerns and have thus longer issue agendas—and their voices are more likely to be present at the political agenda. But instead of interpreting this relevant difference between higher and lower educated for what it is, Waterborg et al. find it necessary to smuggle these disparities away, by focussing on ‘the rank order of the problems’. Using these rankings makes it possible, in their words again, ‘to see the bigger picture’.  But concluding simply on base of the ranks reported in their table 1, ‘that the issue agendas are far from disparate’ is indeed a very broad-brush interpretation of the data. 
	In their second analysis, Waterborg et al. calculate the interpolated median scores -instead of the mean - which in their opinion would be less arbitrary. Although we think that the use of the mean was legitimate for our analytical purposes, there is no objection to replicating the analysis using the median scores. Their new analyses strengthen our conclusions: the gap in policy preferences between non participants with a low level of education and more highly educated participants is even larger than in the original analysis. Although we are not surprised by the results, it is not clear what is gained by this critical replication—it confirms the book’s findings!
	To keep up their critical stance, Waterborg et al. suddenly take a different turn in their interpretation of these findings and they write: ‘There is not a single issue for which one group’s median score is on the other side of the scale than the other group’s median’. Waterborg et al. misstate our analysis: we neither claimed nor implied that the lower and the higher educated had to be on different sides of the 7-points scale. Although it is indeed debatable whether the answers on this type of scales measure the ‘extremity’ (attitude direction) or ‘intensity’ (attitude strength) of political preferences  (Schuman & Presser 1981: 231; Converse & Presser 1986: 37), it is not clear what will be gained by dichotomizing the scale scores—except of dividing the issue dimensions into simple pro and con groups. It entails a loss of information and presupposes the existence of a neutral ‘midpoint’ that can serve as a cut-off point. Given that some of the issues have a ‘valence’ character, we do not expect the educational groups to be neatly spread out in their political preferences over the complete 7 points scale - or even to be on opposite sides. On some issues respondents are simply less polarized than on others. We think that the use of the mean (or the median) is a far better approach to analyse for which issues the preferences between the educational groups are significantly different.
	Most importantly, our findings that educational levels matter with regard to more ‘cultural’ issues, such as immigration, integration, crime, and euro scepticism, are corroborated by many other studies, based on other data-sets than the DPES 2006 or DPES 2010 data. Political sociologists have shown that, particularly among the increasing group of secular citizens, substantial differences in political preferences and social attitudes can be observed between well-educated and less well-educated people on such issues as immigration, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and law and order (Achterberg, 2006; Houtman, Achterberg & Derks, 2008, De Koster et al. 2010; Van der Waal et al. 2010; Aaldering 2011: 16-27). Similarly, many recent studies of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) have consistently pointed to substantial differences in attitudes and preferences in The Netherlands between higher and lower educated strata regarding immigration, multiculturalism, Islam, crime, EU-unification, and environmental protection (Gijsberts & Lubbers 2009: 275; Tammes 2009: 77; Dekker 2009: 128-131; Dekker & Van der Meer 2009: 135-152; De Goede 2011: 140-145; Dekker & Den Ridder 2011: 63-74; Den Ridder, Kullberg, Dekker 2011: 35). Also, the Eurobarometer data show substantial differences between educational strata regarding support for the EU. In fact, throughout Europe the less well-educated groups show significantly less support for EU membership and trust in the European Commission than university graduates, and they are far less positive about the benefits of the EU.​[4]​
Given our reservations about the replications and all the other available empirical evidence, we cannot find any substantiation for the blunt statement of Waterborg et al. that ‘disparate issue agendas and preferences between different education levels are in fact non-existent’. 
On the contrary, in recent years, political scientists and sociologists have started to pay attention to the importance of education levels in the rise of a new, cultural political cleavage in western, post-industrial societies (Van der Waal et al., 2007; Houtman et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2008).  Stubager (2010), for example, has demonstrated the rise of an education cleavage in Danish politics. Since the late eighties, the authoritarian-libertarian dimension has had an increasing electoral salience in Denmark, due to the rise of post material topics, such as immigration and environmentalism. Beneath this conflict over values lies a new educational cleavage, with the well educated consistently tending towards libertarian values and voting for libertarian parties, and the less educated tending towards authoritarian values and voting for more nationalist, authoritarian parties (Stubager 2010: 510, 525). We think this is a relevant and important observation and invite our colleagues from political science to investigate to what extent this is a fruitful perspective to understand recent changes in the Dutch and European political landscape. 
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